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Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Control of Instrumentality.·to invoke the doctrine of res
loquitur
the accident has
eausing the
establish that the eondition of the
instrumentality has not
siuce it left defendant's

[21 Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle .. ·The mere breaking of a milk bottle in a customer's possession while HaHuuiJ."
it cannot give rise to an inference that the dairy delivering
the bottle was negligent in failing to discover the defect.
[3] !d.-Exercise of Care by Vendors.-A dairy is not responsible
for defects in milk bottles that eannot be found by a reasonable, praetica hle inspection.
[ 4] I d.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.---ln an aetion
by a customer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer
for injuries sustained by the custmnt:r when a milk bottle
broke in her hand, the res ipsa loquitur doetrine was not appli·
cable as to the dairy where the customer failed to pre~ent any
evidence to neg·ate maltreatment of thP bottle by her or her
three boys after its delivery three dnys before the aecident,
tlwre being- evidcnee that she had removed the bottle at least
once and used some of its eontents during that period, and
that her husband. and boys had aeccss to the refrigerator.
[5] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.·-Tn an aetion by
a customer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for
injuries sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in
her hand, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was not applicable as
to the manufncturPr where there was no evidence that the
bottle was not mishandled or its condition changed after it
passPd from the manufadurer's control.
See Cal.Jur.2d, N egligenee, § 313 et srq.; Am.Jur.,
g·ence, § 300.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, ~egligenee, § 332 ct seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 306 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] 1--irglig<'w:r,
geJH·e, §BH; [:3] Ke~·ligeneP, §;1();

~

13();

·1, f'>, Tj NegliFood,
~ 1.1(3); [B] Food, § 8(6);
12] KPgligenre, § 125; [11] Evi·
dence, ~ 156(B); [13] Evidence, § 453; [14] Evidenee, § -1[)7 [15]
Trial, § 62.
~290;
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[6] Sales-Breach of Warranty-Evidence.-In an action by a
customer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in
her hand, there was no basis for claiming any breach of warranty on the part of the dairy where there was no evidence
that the bottle was defective when delivered by it to the customer.
[7] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breach of Warranty.-The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty.
[8] Food-Regulation-Milk-Containers.-In an action by a customer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries
sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in her
hand, it was not shown that either defendant had breached
any of the provisions of Agr. Code, § 701, relating to care and
use of containers, where there was no evidence that the bottle
was not "sound, smooth and free from rust" as required by the
code section when delivered by the dairy to the customer's
porch, the only evidence coming from the customer's expert
who testified that the bottle had a "thin" area around the top
but that it did not make the bottle unsafe for the use to which
the dairy applied it.
[9] Id.-Evidence.-In an action by a customer against a dairy
and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, it was not error
to exclude evidence that there were other containers for milk,
where this evidence was immaterial to any issue before the
court.
[10] Negligence-Evidence.-In an action by a customer against
a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by
the customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, it was
proper to exclude evidence that the dairy had delivered six
allegedly defective bottles to the customer's home during the
six months following the accident.
[11] Evidence-Relevancy-Other Accidents.-Generally, evidence
of subsequent accidents has no probative tendency to show that
defendant in a personal injury case might reasonably have
anticipated the previous accident, and such evidence is inadmissible.
[12] Negligence-Evidence.-In an action by a customer against
a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by
the customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, it was
proper to exclude expert testimony as to whether the bottle
was safe and what the standards for milk bottles ought to be

[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, §§ 143-145; Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ 304.
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where the bottle had stood the test of several months' use
and the witness testified that it had no defect that was apparent or could be demonstrated or established and also admitted
that he had no prior experience with milk bottles or the dairy
trade; no foundation was laid for testimony from him regarding what the standards of safety for milk bottles were.
[13] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Qualifications of Expert Witnesses.-An expert is not qualified as a witness unless it is
shown that he is familiar with the standards required under
similar circumstances.
[14] !d.-Opinion Evidence-Qualifications of Expert Witnesses.The trial court's ruling on the sufficiency of qualification of
an expert will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a
showing of abuse of discretion.
[15] Trial-View by Jury.-In an action by a customer against a
dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by the
customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, the trial court
did not err in denying the customer's request that the jury be
permitted to inspect the manufacturer's premises, this being a
matter of discretion for the trial court under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 610, and there being no showing that denial of inspection
constituted an abuse of discretion.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Edward R. Brand, Judge. Affirmed.
Action against a dairy and a glass manufacturer for personal injuries resulting from a milk bottle breaking in customer's hand. Judgment of nonsuit affirmed.
Jerrold A. Fadem for Appellant.
Belcher, Kearney & Fargo, Louis E. Kearney, Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher, Ira C. Powers, Sherman vVclpton, Jr., and Steinhart, Goldberg, Feigenbaum & J_jadar for Respondents.
McCOMB, J.-This is an action for damages for personal
injuries suffered by plaintiff when a milk bottle she was
handling in her kitchen broke as she was in the process of
setting it down on a tile drainboard.
Defendants are Arden Farms Company, hereinafter called
"Arden," and Owens-Illinois Glass Company, hereinafter
called '' Owens. ''
Owens manufactured a milk bottle which Arden filled with
skim milk and delivered to plaintiff by placing it on her porch
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on a
Plaintiff took the milk bottle into
her home and s1 ored it in a
On the
following the Thursday delivery of the
bottle of skim milk here involved, plaintiff was in the process
of setting the bottle, half filled with milk, down on a tile
drainboard when it broke, and she ;;;ustained cuts about the
wrist.
The trial court
defendants' motions for a nonsuit.
Plaintiff appeals from the
presenting these questions:
First: Was the doctr·ine of res ipsa loq1titur appUcable
under the facts of this case as to
defendant Arden or (b)
defendant Owens?
No. [1] A plaintiff seeking to invoke the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur against a defendant who at a time prior to the
accident has relinquished all control of the instrumentality
causing the injury must affirmatively establish that the condition of the instrumentality has not changed since it left the
possession of defendant. (Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson,
Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 195 [7] [293 P.2d 26]; Burr v. Sherwin
Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 691 [10] [268 P.2d 1041];
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottliug Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 458 [2] [150
P.2d 436] .)
The rule is accurately stated by Mr .. Chief Justice Gibson
in Burr v. Sherwin -williams Co., supra, as follows: ''The
instructions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they
purported to state all the conditions under which res ipsa
loquitur would be applicable, thPy did not inform the jury
that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality which
caused the damage was not mishandled or its condition otherwise changed after control was relinquished by the person
against whom the doctrine is to be applied." (Italics added.)
[2] In Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614, 618 [3]
[140 P.2d 369], this rourt said: "The mere breaking of the
bottle alone cannot give rise to an inference that defendant
was negligent in faning to discove1· the defect. [3] \Vhile
the dairy may have had a duty to make an examination of all
bottles, whether newly purchased or returned by prior customers, it is not responsible for defects that cannot be found
by a reasonable, practicable inspection. (Citations.) In the
present case there is no evidence that a feasible means of
discovering the defect or flaw was available to this defendant.
The language of the court in Loebig's Guardian v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124 [81 S.W.2d 910], is particularly
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appropriate. In holding that res
loquitur was not applicable to the explosion of a eoca-rola bottle, the court said
(pp. 911-912): 'The defendant was not, under the circuman insurer, and it was not shown that there was any
more reasonably
method of
used in the
than the method of
adopted
the defendant.
the bottle u;as defeetive. A conelusion of'
conld not arise without some showing
that the def<·et (•ould have hc·en dis(:overrd by the exercise of
earP . . . . fn the instant (•m;e Wf' are still left to
as to the ('anse of the defeet in the bottle and
its contents or whether it was such a defeet as might have
been diseovcred by a more thorough inspection. Unless we
are prepared to hold defendaut as an insurer, it is hard to see
how else it could be held responsible without some showing that
its opportunity to exercise carE> was in some measure proportionate to the dnl~' imposed~-~~without some showing that a
more thorough inspection would have been effective. Plaintiff's experts suggest various methods of testing bottles which
might be applied, hut it is not shown that these tests are
commercially praeiicable or that they would have disclosed
the complained-of defect. . . . \Ve must measure the duty
by ordinary standards and by eonsequenees rea,:;;onably to be
anticipated. Snhjeet to these eritrria, it is clear that the
proof falls short of rai;;ing any i nfr:'renr:e of negligence.'
"In L1'cari v. j,Jarkotos, 110 Misc. 334 [180 N.Y.S. 278],
the court held a bottler not liable for injuries caused by
breaking of a bottle of a non-explosive cleaning and dyeing
preparation, saying (p. 280 [N.Y.S.]): 'Nor is there any force
in respondent's contention, strenuously urged upon this appeal, that the defendant failed in his duty to inspect the
bottles before filling them; this for the reason that there is no
proof that any examination or inspection would have found
the existence of any defert. If sueh had been the ease, it was
the plaintiff's duty to give evidence thereof. Bruckel v.
J. Milhau's Son, 116 App. Div. [832] 836 [102 N.Y.S. 395].
In the absrnce of such evidence, the learned trial justice had
no foundation upon which to predicate any finding of negligence on defendallt 's part, and a judgment for plaintiff could
be based on none other than speculation and pure guesswork.'''
[4] (a) vViih reference to Arden, the record discloses that
on the day the bottle in question, filled with skim milk, had
been deliverrd to plaintiff's porch, plaintiff had carried the
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container holding that bottle and other bottles of milk into
the house, wiped the bottles, and put them in the refrigerator.
All bottles of milk were stored on one wire shelf in the refrigerator, which shelf held eight bottles. The average daily
delivery of milk to plaintiff's home was fonr bottles. When
plaintiff had placed the bottles of fresh milk on this shelf, she
followed her custom of moving the bottles of older milk
forward on the shelf and storing the bottles of fresh milk
behind them. To this procedure there was one exception,the bottle of skim milk received in the delivery was always
kept at the front of the shelf.
The accident occurred on Sunday, March 7, 1954, and
involved the bottle of skim milk delivered the preceding
Thursday. Between the time of the delivery of the particular
bottle of skim milk and the time of the accident, the bottle
had been removed at least once by plaintiff and some of the
contents used. Plaintiff had three children, aged 10, 9 and
5 at the time of the accident, each of whom had access to the
milk in the refrigerator. The skim milk bottle was identified
for the children by a band placed around the neck of the
bottle by plaintiff.
From the foregoing evidence, it is clear that any of plaintiff's three children, having as they did access to the refrigerator at all times, may have struck the bottle of skim milk
with another bottle and damaged it prior to the time of the
accident, or it may in some other manner or fashion have been
damaged.
The children were not called as witnesses to negate maltreatment of and damage to the bottle by them prior to the
time of the accident. Plaintiff's husband, who also had access
to the refrigerator, was called as a witness, but he made no
attempt to show that the bottle had not been damaged after
it had been received and prior to the time of the accident.
From the foregoing evidence, it is clear that the above
stated rule was not met in the present case and that there
is a complete hiatus as to what, if anything, happened to the
bottle between the time it was placed in the refrigerator by
plaintiff and the time the injury occurred. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to the facts of
this case.
[5] (b) With reference to Owens, there is a total absence
of any evidence that the bottle was not mishandled or its
condition changed after it.passed from Owens' control.
Since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable
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and there was a total absence of any evidence of negligence
upon the part of either defendant, the nonsuit was properly
granted.
[6] Second: Was there a breach of warranty upon the part
of Ardenf1
No. There was no evidence that the bottle was defective
when delivered by Arden to plaintiff, and therefore there is no
basis for claiming any breach of warranty. [7] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence
and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty.
(Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Portland Cordage Co., 51 Ore. 583
[95 P. 498, 499]; Poovey v. International Sugar Peed No. 2
Co., 191 N.C. 722 [133 S.E. 12, 14 [3, 4]]; Btonebrink v. Highland Motors, 171 Ore. 415 [137 P.2d 986, 990]; cf. Gerber v.
Faber, 54 Cal.App.2d 674, 686 [4] et seq. [129 P.2d 485] .)
[8] Third: Was there any evidence that defendants, or
either of them, breached any of the provisions of section 701
of the Agricultural Codet2
No. There was no evidence that the bottle in question was
not ''sound, smooth and free from rust'' as required by
section 701 of the Agricultural Code when delivered by Arden
to plaintiff's porch. The only evidence on this subject carne
from plaintiff's expert, who testified that the bottle had a
'Plaintiff and defendant Owens stipulated that plaintiff had no cause
of action for a breach of warranty against defendant Owens.
•section 701 of the Ag1-ieultura1 Code reads:
"(a) Every restaurant, school, hospital, soda fountain or other place
where food or drink is served to the public, which sells milk, cream, ice
cream, ice milk, buttermilk or any combination thereof for consumption
on the premises, upon emptying the eontainers thereof, which are to be
returned to the milk distributor or manufacturer, shall cause such containers, except glass containers, to be rinsed and drained.
'' (b) All containers of milk, cream or products thereof which are
delivered to the consumer by any retailer or distributor and which are
to be returned to such retailer or distributor shall be rinsed and drained
before they are returned.
"(e) All containers except single service containers of any kind
in which milk or any product of milk is kept, stored, transported or
delivered, shall be sound, smooth, free from rust or open seams and at
all times kept in a condition which will permit thorough cleansing of
all surfaces with which the milk or its products come in contact. Con·
tainers including ice cream cabinets commonly used or intended for the
reception, storage or delivery of milk, cream or products thereof shall be
used exclusively for the storage and use of milk and milk products and
shall not be used for any other purpose. All empty containers delivered
to any producer, manufacturer, retailer or distributor for the reception
of milk or any product of milk shall be kept in a clean, sanitary, and
sterile condition and shall be used for no other purpose.''
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"thin"
around the top but that
did not make such
bottle unsafe for the nse to which .Arden applied it.
[9] Fourth: Did the trial court err in
evidence?
No. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in not
her to introduce evidence:
That there were other containers for milk such as round
stippled bottles, cardboard cartons, and others.
This evidence was clearly immaterial to any issue before
the court. Although glass is subject to breakage, it has many
qualities as a food container which no paper container can
fulfill, e.g., lower porosity, impermeability to odor, transparency, and cleanliness.
[10] (b) That Arden had delivered six allegedly defective
milk bottles to plaintiff's home during the six months following the accident.
This evidence was also properly excluded. [11] It is the
general rule that evidence of subsequent accidents has no
probative tendency to show that a defendant might reasonably
have anticipated the previous accident, and therefore such
evidence is inadmissible. (McCormick v. Great Western Power
Co., 214 Cal. 658, 668 [5] [8 P.2d 145, 81 A.L.R. 678].)
[12] Fifth: Did the t1·ial court unduly limit the examination of the expert w1:tness, Benson?
No. Plaintiff contends that the witness should have been
permitted to testify as to whether the bottle was safe and what
the standards for milk bottles ought to be.
This testimony was properly excluded for the reason that
the bottle had stood the test of at least several months' use
and the witness testified that the bottle had no defect that
was apparent or could be demonstrated or established. He
also admitted that he had had no prior experience with milk
bottles or the dairy trade. Therefore, no foundation was laid
for testimony from him regarding what the standards of
safety for milk bottles were.
[13, 14] The rule is settled that an expert is not qualified
as a witness unless it is shown that he is familiar with the
"The witness testified:
"The Court: (Interrupting) There isn't any question but what thinner
glass is more susceptible to breakage than thicker glass, but is it of
such a degree that it would make the bottle, as a unit, unsafe, or have
an effect on its safety-have an effect on its safety for the use for
which it is intended?
" The Witness: I wouldn't say that, no."
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standards required under similar circumstances (Huffman v.
Lindquist, 37 Cal.2d 465, 476 [9] [234 P.2d 34, 29 A.L.R.2d
485] ) ; also, that the trial court's ruling upon the sufficiency
of the qualification of an expert will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion.
(Beresford v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Go., 45 Cal.2d 738, 749 [13]
[290 P.2d 498, 54 A.L.R.2d 910]; Bennett v. Los Angeles
Tumor Institute, 102 Cal.App.2d 293, 296 [ 4} [227 P.2d 473] ;
Rudat v. Carithers, 137 CaLApp. 92, 97 [3] [30 P.2d 435].)
In the present case the evidence did not meet the above
requirements.
[15] Sixth: Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's
request that the jury be permitted to inspect Owens' premises?
No. Section 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
"When, in the opinion of the Court, it is proper for the jury
to have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in which any material fact occurred, it
may order them to be conducted, in a body, under the charge
of an officer, to the place, which shall be shown to them by
some person appointed by the Court for that purpose. 'While
the jury are thus absent, no person, other than the person
so appointed, shall speak to them on any subject connected
with the trial." (Italics added.)
It is thus evident that the matter of inspection is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of
a showing of abuse of discretion, as in the present case, the
trlal court's denial of an inspection will not be disturbed on
appeal. (Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel, 36 Cal.2d 493, 501 [6]
[225 P.2d 497] ; Lagttna Salada etc. Dist. v. Pacific Dev. Go.,
119 Cal.App.2d 470, 477 [14] [259 P.2d 498].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the
judgment insofar as it sustains the granting of nonsuit as to
Owens-Illinois Glass Company, but disagree with a similar
conclusion reached in connection with defendant Arden
Farms.
The majority concludes that plaintiff failed to present any
evidence to negate maltreatment of the bottle by her and her
family after its delivery, and thus, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply. It is also held that there is no
evidence to support a finding of breach of warranty since no
50 C.2d-8
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defect in the bottle had been shown to exist. On the basis
of the facts as stated in the majority opinion these conclusions
are warranted. However, it is submitted that there are
material omissions in the ma;jority '" faetual statement, which,
when viewed aecording to the rule on nonsuit, renders such
conelusions erroneous.
The reeord reveals that plaintiff established the following
uneontroverted faets. The bottle in question was manufaetured by Owens sometime in 1953; part of the manufaeturing
process required that Arden's name be written on the bottle.
Shortly thereafter the bottle was sent to Arden and used in
their business of deliveriJJg milk for the months preceding the
time of breaking in 1954. At the manufacturing stage bottles
are subjected to a test for visual defeets, and in addition,
manufacturer Owens conducts statistical tests for latent defects. 'l'hese statistieal tests eonsist of taking a certain number
of bottles from the production line and subjecting them to
thermal-shoek impact tests whieh reveal any latent defects.
This test is regardl'd as 95-98 per cent effeetive in insuring
that the remaining bottles not so tested will be free from
hidden defects. At the bottling level, Arden inspeets new as
well as returned bottles for visual defects to discover any
damage that might have occurred in shipping or while in use,
but no test is maintained to diseover latent defects.
Plaintiff's expert witness testified that he had examined
the reconstrueted parts of the broken bottle and that the cause
of the bottle's breaking was impaet, but that from observing
the fragmentation pattern of the percussion eone and the
absence of spalling ( ehipping and shattering) the eon tact
was extremely mild. He further stated that an analysis of
the fragmentation pattern led him to the eonelusion that the
bottle could have only broken because of a defect. His study
indicated that the defect was at the base of the bottle, but
it was impossible to determine its precise nature.
Plaintiff's milk delivery consisted of four quarts of milk,
induding a quart of skim milk, every other day, which was
plaeed on a refrigerator shelf having space for eight quarts.
The quart of skim milk being distinguished from the other
bottles by a blue rubber hand placed around its neck.
As to the treatment of the bottle after it was delivered,
plaintiff testified that she was always careful with the milk
bottles, and that the skim milk while kept on the same shelf
as the homogenized milk was apart from it, permitting access
to the homogenized milk without disturbing the skim milk.
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Plaintiff also stated that no member of her family, including
the children, had ever broken any bottles, and that no one
but herself used the skim mille No objection was made to the
evidence of past acts of due care.
The question before this court is whether disregarding conflicting evidenee, giving to the plaintiff's evidence all the
value to which it is legally entitled, and indulging in every
legitimate inferenee which may be drawn from that evidence,
the evidenee is of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict
in favor of plaintiff (see Leonard v. ·watsonville Community
H osp#al, 47 Cal.2d 509, 514-515 [305 P .2d 36]).
Reading the evidence presented against the background of
this rule, it must be concluded that plaintiff has established a
prima facie case against Arden based upon three possible
theories : ( 1) negligenee by invoking the doetrine of res ipsa
loquitur; (2) uegligenee by proof of speeifie aets; and (3)
breaeh of warranty, rendering the nonsuit improper in this
regard. Ho~ovever, as to Owens, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima faeie case based either on the doetrine of res ipsa
loquitur or speeific acts of negligenee, and sinee plaintiff
stipulated that no breaeh of warranty aetion existed against
Owens the granting of the nonsuit in this respeet was proper.
In eonneetion with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it may
be invoked where (1) defendant had exelusive control of the
instrumentality eausing the injury, and (2) the aceident is of
sueh a nature that it ordinarily would not oecur in the
absenee of negligence of defendant (see Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 457-458 [150 P.2d 436] ). The
exclusive control requirement is modified to the extent that
if defendant had eontrol at the time of the alleged negligent
aet and plaintiff proves that the eondition of the instrumentality causing the injury had not ehanged after it left defendant's possession, then plaintiff may avail himself of the
doctrine providi11g the other eonclition is satisfied (see Honea
v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614, 617-618 [140 P.2d 369];
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra, 458). The extent of
plaintiff's burden of proving that the condition of the instrumentality is unchanged is fully dis(~ussed in Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., snpm, 458-459, where it is stated: "It is
not neeessary, of course, that plaintiff eliminate every remote
possibility of injury to the bottle after defendant lost control,
and the requirement is satisfied if there is evidence permitting
a reasonable inference that it was not aeeessible to extraneous
harmful forces and that it was earefully handled by plaintiff
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or any third person who may have moved or touched it. [Citation.] If such evidence is presented, the question becomes
one for the trier of fact [citation], and accordingly, the issue
should be submitted to the jury under proper instruetions."
(S0e also Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436,
444 [247 P.2d 344].)
CoHtrary to the majority opinion there is evidence which
can form the basis of a rea'lonable iuferenee that the condition
of the bottle had not changed. Plaintiff testified that she
handled the bottle with due care. This evidence is sufficient
to satisfy the requirement that the bottle had not ehauged
insofar as plaintiff's handling is concerned (see Honea v. City
Dairy, Inc., S1tpra, 618). ·while there is no clireet evidence that
the bottle was carefully handled by third persons having
access to it, there is circumstantial evidence on which a
reasonable inference can be predicated that these persons
exercised due care in handling the milk bottle, if they handled
it at all. Plaintiff stated that no one in her family had ever
broken a bottle. She added that the bottle was not used by
any other member of her family. Sud1 sole use being guar·anteed by the faet the bottle >ms designated by a blue rubber
band, its purpose known to all members of the household. It
was further established that while all the milk bottles were
kept on the same shelf, the skim was kept "apart" from the
homogenized milk. It may be inferred from the faet that the
shelf had space for eight bottles, ancl only four were delivered
every other day, that being ''apart'' was of sufficient degree
that access to the homogenized milk was possible without
disturbing the skim milk From the combination of the facts
that the skim milk was used only by plaintiff, and that no
member of the family had ever broken a bottle, plus the inference that the skim milk was "apart" permitting access
to other bottles, a jury could reasonably conclude that the
third persons did not touch the skim milk or if they did it was
done with due eare.
Having met the burden of showing that her conduct and
her family's action did not in any way deviate from the exercise of due care, which consequently excludes the possibility
of the aceident being caused by plaintiff or her family, plaintiff can now invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur by showing that the manner in which the bottle was broken do.~s not
ordinarily happen without negligence for which Arden is
probably responsible.
The substantive content of this requirement has been vari-
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able, aud it is necessary to review the cases discussing it. As
a preliminary point all eases agree that bottlers of beverages,
including dairies, have a duty of care to inspect bottles
whether newly purchased or returned by prior customers (see
Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., supra, 618; Bscola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., supra, 460; Oordon v. A.ztec Brewing Co., 33
Cal.2d 31-t., ill/ j20:l l'.2d :i22J; Zcuf2 v. Coca Cola Hottl£ng
Co., su.pra, 448). In Honea v. City Dcriry, Inc., supra, it was
held that the breaking of a milk bottle is alone insuffh·ient
under the doetrine of res ipsa loquitur to permit the additional
and ne~essary inference of negligence by defendant, either in
eausiug the defective condition or in failing to diseovcr it by
proper inspection. However, in reaching this conclusion a
rule was suggested that where plaintiti can demonstrate that
there was a defect and there were reasonable nwans of diseovering the defect in the exercise of due care, then this
constitutes sufficient evidence from which to infer that it is
more probable than not defendant was negligent in failing
to discover the defeet. This suggested rule was adopted in
Escola v. Coca, Cola Bott/iug Co., supra, 438, all(l again in
Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., supm. In the Escola ease this
eourt permitted the applieation of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur after plaintiff had established that no unreasonable
extraneous foree had aeted upon the bottle subsequent to
delivery, and upon the ground there was an inferenee that
defendant failed to exercise due care in inspecting the bottle
since it could be determined from the evidence that the bottle
had a visual defect that could have been ascertained by a
reasonable inspection. 'rhe evidence relied upon to ereate
such an inference dealt with the i11spection methods in the
industry. Pollowing the Escola ~ase this court was faeed with
a similar question in Gm·don v. Aztec B1·cw1:ng Co., supra, and
the Eseola rule was followed. 'ro summarize the law as it
existed after the Aztec Brewing Company case, plaintiff was
entitled to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in cases
involving bursting or breaking bottles where ( 1) there was
a showing that no external harmful force touched the bottle
after leaving defendant's control and (2) where evidence was
presented that the bottle contained a defeet that could be
discovered by a practieable and reasonable inspection.
In Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., S1tpra, the former requirement was retained while the latter was altered materially.
The rule this court announced therein stated that plaintiff
may invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine where he introduces
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evidence sufficient to warrant an inference that the bottle was
not mistreated subsequent to its delivery by defendant and
where the accident was of such a nature that it can be said, in
the light of past experience, that it probably was the result
of negligence by someone and defendant is probably the person who is responsible (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., s1~pra,
446), The court determined that if plaintiff demonstrated
that he was not an intervening cause, the happening of the
exploding bottle gave rise to an inference of negligent conduct on the part of the defendant. This ruling leads to the
conclusion that it is no longer necessary to present evidence
that the defect could have been discovered by a practicable
and reasonable inspection before the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may be invoked. The test now is whether from the
happening of the accident it is more probable than not that
defendant was negligent.
Applying this rule to the case at bar it is clear that an
inference of negligence arises from the breaking of the bottle.
Plaintiff has established that no harmful intervening forces
touched the bottle after it left defendant's control; common
experience tells us that glass milk bottles, when handled as
plaintiff did, do not ordinarily break, and since Arden has
a duty to inspect bottles for visual defects, it is more probable
that a dangerous bottle was placed on the market by a negligent act of Arden, and it is, therefore, responsible for the
damage caused. Moreover, in this case we have expert testimony that the bottle broke as a result of a defect, which
renders the inference that defendant was negligent in either
wholly failing to inspect the bottle, or in failing to make a
reasonable inspection all the more probable. This probability
is further underscored by the principle that the possibility
of the defect in the bottle being latent and not visually discoverable is regarded as insufficient to prevent the application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bot-

tling Co., supra, 449).
I am unconvinced by the distinction attempted to be drawn
in the Zentz case between bottles that contain carbonated beverages and bottles that contain milk or noncarbonated beverages (see dissenting opinion, Honea v. City Dairy, Inc.,
supra, 623). The question is not whether the bottle contains
carbonated or noncarbonated beverages, but whether it is safe
to use for the purpose designed. If a bottle containing milk
breaks in a customer's hand, the inference of defendant's
negligence is no less probable than if a bottle containing a
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carbonated beverage explodes. In either case the bottle was
not safe for its proposed use because of some defect from which
we infer a bottler's negligence in failing to discover it. The
nature of the beverage adds nothing to this inference.
In addition, plaintiff's evidence would support a finding
that Arden failed to reasonably inspect the bottle, violating
its duty of care. As discussed previously, plaintiff and her
family did not mistreat the bottle subsequent to its delivery
by defendant, and what is the corollary, the defect was in
existence prior to plaintiff's handling. Owens established
that their inspection for latent defects is 95-98 per cent infallible, which plaintiff's expert substantiated, further stating
that he found no latent defect in the bottle. 'fhis evidence
plus the fact that the bottle was in use for several months by
Arden sustains a reasonable inference that the bottle had no
latent defects, and the defect that did exist was a visible one.
From the foregoing it follows that the defect was one that defendant should have discoYered when inspecting the bottles
and failure to do so constitutes negligent conduct which the
jury could find proximately caused plaintiff's injury.
The evidence presented by plaintiff, as indicated above, also
supports a cause of action predicated on breach of implied
warranty under section 1735 of the Civil Code. In substance
section 1735 provides that the seller of goods impliedly warrants to the buyer who relies on the seller's skill that the goods
shall be reasonably fit for the purpose sold or if a sale by
description the goods are of merchantable quality. Preliminary to maintaining an action for breach of warranty the
California cases require privity,* i.e., the buyer can only sue
his immediate seller (Bnrr v. Sherwin Will1'ams Co., 42 Cal.2d
682,695-696 [268 P.2d 10±1]), noti<·r (Whitfield v. Jessup,
31 CaL2d 826, 828 [193 P.2d 1] ), sale (Mix v. Ingersoll
Candy Co., 6 Cal.2d 674, 676 [59 P.2d 144] ), and a reliance
on the seller's judgment that the goods are fit for the purpose
sold ( Civ. Code, § 1735).
These prerequisites have been satisfied. It is clear plaintiff
was in privity with Arden, that proper notiee was given and
that plaintiff relied on Arden's judgment that the bottle was
*California admits an exception to the privity requirement in cases
involving foodstuffs where it is held that an implied warranty of fitness
for human consumption runs from the manufacturer to the ultimate
consumer regardless of privity of contract. (Klein v. Duchess Sandwich
Co., Ltd., 14 Cal.2d 272 [93 P.2d 799]; Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal.
App.2d G87, 689 [1G3 P.2d 470].)
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safe as a container for milk. However, a question does arise
as to whether there was a sale of the bottle. This has never
been authoritatively answered in California and there is a
split among the cases in other jurisdictions that have considered the question, but the weight of authority is that there
is a sale of the bottle. In Na1tmann v. Wehlc Brew£ng Co., 127
Conn. 44 [15 A.2d 181], it was held that the warranty under
the sales act extends to a returnable beverage container, ruling
that there had been a sale of the bottle. To the same effect,
11;fclntyre v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co. (lVIo.), 85
F.Supp. 708, 711; Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613 [258 P.2d
317]; ivleacl v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440 [108
N.E.2d 757]. In two other states, New Jersey and New York,
the courts have ruled that in the sale of consumer goods in a
bottle, the seller warrants the fitness of the container as much
as the contents on the ground that the container is an essential part of the transaction, it being immaterial whether the
bottle is sold with the contents or subject to a refund of deposit or return. (Cooper v. Newman, 11 N.Y.S.2d 319; see
Healey v. Trodd, 124 N.,J.h 64 [11 A.2d 88].)
The jurisdictions that have denied extending the warranty
to the container have done so on the grounds either that
the container was not covered by the act (Poplar v. Hochschild,
Kahn & Co., 180 lVId. 389 [24 1\.. 2d 788] ), or that the Uniform Sales Act had not been adopted in their jurisdiction
(Soter v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302
[193 P.2d 575, 4 A.L.R.2d 458] ). In the only California
case, the court, in dictum, discussed the question in a light
that docs not speak favorably of extending warranty to the
container (Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal.App.2d 674, 687-688 [129
P.2d 485] ). However, this case is by no means conclusive
and should not operate to prevent this court from considering
the problem as an original proposition.
I am persuaded that the more reasoned rule, supported by
the realities of the situation is that the warranty extends to
the milk bottle whether returnable or not, there being a "sale"
of the milk bottle within the meaning of that word as it is
used in Civil Code, section 1735, when it is delivered to a
customer. In fact the buyer had no choice but to aecept the
bottles delivered by Arden. They were seleeted solrly by the
seller for the purpose of eontaining milk, and plarrd at the
buyer's doorstep by Ardrn 's ehoice alone. Since a container
is necessary for the sale of milk, Arden in any sneh sale must
provide a container suitable for the purpose and the failure
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<·ntd,llll<'r \\l>!!l<l r•·JH!c•J· the c;Hl<• of milk as we
impos~i bl<'. Tlms, tlw dairy's sale
ilw ('fllllniner as lllH<'h a.~ nw milk. The faet the
bottle may he retl!l'lH'(l docs uot pren~nt there being a "sale"
of il. for n·tnruing hoitlc.~ is not mmHlatory upon the customer, who llla)' b•ep it in his dis,·rdion, bnt returns it as a
HHtt!t·r uf t·OIJvcni<'JH'l' to himse.lf and the dairy, whieh in turn
savc·s !Jim additional expense in purehasing mille
\Vit h tlH: preliminary reqniremPnts satisfied it is now
possilJlt~ to tonsicler whether 1he e1·iclen<'l' would support a
verdiet that there lm;; bct>n a brcadt of implied \\'iUTanty.
This question inYoln·s aseertaining what it is that A.rden
impliedly \l'ananis. PlaiJitiff eontnHls the implied warranty
is that the bottle is fit Jor the pnrposc for whid1 it is snpplit>d,
llallu"ly as a ('Outainer fot' milk, anc1 that when a defective
botth· is plaecc1 on thr nwrket there i;; a breaeh of this warr·auty, whieh renders Anleu absolutely liable to an immediate
buyer· withont proof of JJegligeJH·P for any injnry caused by
the c!ef('('t.
Normally it i;,; a p(Jlic·y question wht>ther a partitular warranty ;;honld be imposetl, whieh imposition requires the court
to choose a party who is best suited to bear the burden of
absolnte liability in order to proted the cormumer who is not
in a position to do so himself (see coneul'l'ing opiniom, Escola
Y. Coca Cola Boftlinq Co., supra, 4G2-·464; Gordon v. Aztec
Bi'Cii'iJI[J Co., supra, 5:30).
Portnnatcly in this r:ase we are
aidt>r1 in our poliey detjsion by a ~tatement of legislative intent
ll'hieh strongly suggests that the implir'd warranty argued for
is to be applied. '!'his stateme11t is found in section 701 of
the .Agrieultnral Code and provides in part: "(c) All containers cxr·.ept single scrvieP r·ontaiucrs of any kind in which
milk or any product of milk is kept, ;;tored, transported or
delivr~rcd, shall bP sound, smooth, free from rnst or open seams
and at all timPs ln·pt in a r:oll(lition whith will permit thorough
r·J,'ansing of' all snrfaees ·ll'ith whieh the milk or its products
r:OltHc in <·on tact . . . . "
This S<'e.tion ercates a duty on the
part of all suppliPrs of milk procluets to use sound bottles
and thereby argues powerf1tlly for the proposition that an
implied 1nurant,v in tbis respect is to be imposed. Certainly
Reetion 701 permits us to WP1W ourselves from the belief that
suC'h a warranty is agaiu~t traditional praetiees. Adding to
the foree of the statute, eases where implied warranties have
been found to exist, :meh as food cases referred to above,
and eases involving fitnPss and strength of component parts
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Austin 'l'miler Equip. Co., 102
) there seems little or no
reason for detcrmiuing that such a warnmty does not exist
in this ease. 'l'o the contrary all authority and reason press
for the
of such a warranty siuee Arden is in
the better position to know of the quality of the thing dealt
with and may forestall any injury to its customers, who
refrain from taking proteetivc care in reliance on
the seller removing all dangers ot defective bottles. And
finally as a matter of poliey a warranty should be imposed
on the grounds that "'I' he cost of an injury and the loss of
time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can
be insured by the manufaeturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business." (Concurring opinion,
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supm, 462.) Arden can be
held to impliedly warrant, therefore, that all milk bottles
will be safe for normal use and free from any unreasonable
dangerous defects.
'l'o render Arden liable under the warranty theory plaintiff must show that the goods were unreasonably dangerous
either for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or
for some special use which was brought to the attention of
the seller, and that the unreasonably dangerous condition
existed when the goods left the seller's hands (M1:x v. Ingersoll Candy Co., supr·a; Silva v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 28 Cal.
App.2d 649 l83 P.2d 76]). The same evidence used to establish the theories of negligence also may be applied to demonstrate that there was a defect, which rendered the ordinary
use of the bottle dangerous, and that it existed prior to plainiff's acquisition. Having introduced evidenee to support the
essential elements in a breach of warranty action Arden is
liable regardless of any proof of negligence.
Turning to the question of the correctness of the nonsuit
as to Owens we need discuss only the theories of negligence
in view of the stipulation pertaining to breach of warranty.
As far as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is concerned, it
appears that based upon past experience we cannot say that
from the breaking of the bottle it is more probable than not
Owens was negligent. The evidence established that the defect
was a visible one and not latent, indicating that Owens performed its duty to inspect for latent defects with due care.
Secondly the bottle was in use for several months after its
delivery to Arden. The inference from this evidence is that
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sometime after Arden put it to use
and common knowledge tell us that if
since
the defeet that existed at the time of the breaking, existed
when the bottle was
Arden, the bottle would have
or by the first several customers
been broken in Arden's
it. Because it did
break the most
inference
is that the bottle left Owens free of defects.
Nor can the res
loquitur doctrine be invoked on the
ground that plaintiff is in doubt as to which defendant is
liable. Plaintiff relies on Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486
[154 P.2d 687, 162 A.I.~.R. 1258], and Summers v. Tice, 33
Cal.2d 80 [199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R2d 91], but in those cases
the application of the doctrine >vas permitted because plaintiff was faced with the dilemma of being able to prove a
negligent act, but unable to prove which of the multiple
defendants committed the act. In the instant case plaintiff is
not faced with such dilemma, but is able to show exactly which
defendant was negligent and what the nature of this negligence was. Under such circumstance plaintiff cannot claim
multiple defendants justifies invoking the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
As for proving Owens committed specific acts of negligence
the record is devoid of any evidence which would support
such a finding.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court
should be affirmed as to defendant Owens, but reversed with
rPspeet to defendant Arden Farms.
TRA. YNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-The evidence
that plaintiff handled the bottle carefully and that the impact causing it to break was only a mild one was sufficient
to support a finding that it waR defective when Ardens Farms
delivered it to plaintiff. It is reasonable to inft>r not only that
this impact occurred when plaintiff placed the bottle on the
drain board but that it waR no more severe than the normal
impact attending such placement. Therefore plaintiff's expert could justifiably conclude that the bottle was defective
in some way at the time it broke, even though he could not
determine the nature of the defect from an examination of
the broken bottle. It could reasonably be inferred that no
other member of plaintiff's family handled the bottle, since
she was the only one who nscd skimmed milk and it was her
custom to identify the bottle of such milk with a rubber band
and to set it to one side of the milk-bottle tray in the refrig-
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erator. Conceivably others in the
could have struck
the other bottles against that one; but that possibility is
remote given the evidence that no member of the family had
ever broken a milk bottlr. Milk bottlPs arr ordinarily stnrdy
enough to withstand thr impacts of normal usage. 'l'he bottle
in question was not, and it is therefore reasonablr to ronelude
that it was defective when delivered to plaintiff. (See Gordon
v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514. 582 f203 P.2d 522],
concurring opinion.)
Although I believe that there is also sufficient evidence
of the other elements of a cause of action for breach of warranty, I would emphasize that "'l'he remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies
of the law of sales." (!1 ettcrer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322,
323; Klein v. Duchess 8and1cich ('o., Ltd .. 14 Cal.2r1 272, 282
[93 P.2d 799] .) Liability should not be determined mechanically by fortuitous eirrnnu;taneeR. It should not be controlling
that the injury occurs after rather than before a sale. (Compare l}fead v. Coca Cola Bottli11g Co., 329 Mass. 440 [108
N.E.2d 757, 7G9] [bottle exploded after it was taken from
vending machine: warranty J with Lasky v. Economy GTocery
Stores, 319 Mass. 224 [65 N.E.2d 80;), 307] [bottle exploded
before customer in srlf-serviee storP earrird it past the check
stand: no warranty J.) It should 11ot he eontrolling that the
bottle is sold rathrr than bailed. (See Cooper v. Newman, 11
N.Y.S.2d 319, 320; GeddliiiiJ v. Marsl1 [1920], 1 K.B. 668,
672-673.) It should not be eon trolling that the consumer is
found to be in privity of eontraet with the defendant rather
than not. (See Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Lid., 14 Cal.
2d 272 [93 P.2d 799].) The liability of the manufacturer
should not turn on whethrr he has "rmJiracted" to assume it
under fmeh erratic tests that haphazardly afford recovery to
some and deny it to others. "[P] ublic policy demands that
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effeeiively reduce
the hazards to life and Jwalth inherrnt in defective products
that reach the market." (E~eola v. Coca Cola Bottlin.IJ Co.,
24 Cal.2d 453, 462 [J 50 P.2d 4361, ronenrriug opinion; see
2 Harper and ,James, Torts, pp. 1570 et seq.)
In the Eseola ease, a" in Oordotl Y. Azfr•<o Rr!'ll'iii(J Co.,
33 Cal.2d 514 1203 P.2d 522], the <·omt invoked res ipsa loquitur to affirm jndgnwnts for damagrs rrsulting from c>xplosions
of beverage hottles. l\fy own <'OIH'11l'l'<'twe in those judgments
rested on the gronnd that "it should now he recognized that
a manufaeturer ineurR au absolute liability -when an article
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that lw has pla<·ed on the mark<•t. knowing that it is to be used
without in;;pedion. prove:; t.o have a drfe<:t that causes injury
to human lwings." (24 Cal.2d at 461.) I adhere to that
view and would therrfon• rrYrrse the judgment of nonsuit
in favor of ArdPn Farms in this casr.
Although thifl eonrt in Bun· v. SheJ'win vVilliam.s Co., 42
Ca1.2cl G82, G9,)-G9G r 2G8 P .2<1 I 041], refm;rd to extend fltrict
liability to property damage in the abseuee of privity of contract or an express representation of the manufacturer relied
upon by the ultimate purc·haser, it has recognized that manufacturers are strictly liable to the consumer in cases of foodstnffs. (Klein v. Ducl1css Sandu•ich Co., Ltd., 14. Cal.2d 272
[93 P.2d 799].) To date a majority of the court have solved
the problem of liability for harm caused by defective food
containers in terms of neglig·ence without considering strict
liability as an alternative ground of recovery. (Honea v.
City Dairy, Inc., 22 CaL2d Gl4 [140 P.2d 369] ; Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453 [150 P.2d 436] ; Gordon
v. Aztec Brcu·ing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514 [203 P.2d 522]; Zentz v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436 [247 P.2d 344].) Whatever the arguments for limiting the manufacturer's strict liability to foodstuffs, there is no rational basis for differentiating behveen foodstuffs and their containers. (Nichols v.
Nolcl, 174 Kan. 613 [258 P.2d 317, 323]; Cooper v. Newman,
11 N.Y.S.2d 319., 320; Haller v. Rudmann, 249 App.Div. 831
j292 N.Y.S. 58(), 587]; Mcintyre v. J[ansas City Coca Cola
Bottling Co. (JVIo), 85 .B'ed.Rupp. 708, 711; Mahoney v.
Shaker Square Bel'cmucs, Ohio C:. P., 102 N.E.2d 281, 289;
Oeddling v. Marsh. jl920] 1 K.B. GGS, G72-673; ~~lorelli v.
Pitch and Gibhons. rJ928] 2 K.R. G:J6, G42-644; sec Prosser,
Torts, [2d rd.j § 84, p. GOD.) It would elarify the law torepudiate that differrntiation OJwnly rathrr than to eircumvent
it covertly and haphaila rdl,\· hy lea viug juries free to impose
strict liability if ilH>y so choose, under the guise of res ipsa
loquitur. (See roneurring opinion in Gordon v. Aztec Brew'ing Co., 33 Ca1.2d 514, G:J2 [203 P.2d 522], Hlld cases eited.)
There is no evidence that the bottle was defective when
it was delivered to Arden Farms by Owens-Illinois. Since
it withstood usage by Arden Farms and its customers for
many months, the only reasonable inference is that it was
not defective when Owens-Illinois delivered it to Arden
Parms. 'l'he nonsuit in favor of Owens-Illinois was therefore
proper under any theory of liability. I would tlwrefore affirm
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as to defendant Owens-Illinois and reverse it as
to def<:ndant Ardrn Farms.
CHBSON, C .•T., Coneurring- and Dissenting-.--It is clear
that, as to Owens, the :i udgment of nonsuit should be affirmed.
The
stipulated that plaintiff had no cause of action
against Owens for bn;aeh of warranty, and she failed to make
a prima facie ease
this defendant based on neg-ligence.
A1t1JOngh there is substantial +'vich:m·e that the breaking of the
bottle resulted from a defeet in it, there is no evidence from
which it can br inferred that this defeet was present when
the bottle was cldiverc(l b.\- Owens to ~\.rden, who thereafter
used it for several months before it broke.
\Vith respect to Arden, however, I am of the virw that the
judg·ment of nonsuit should be rt'versecl, because the evidence
is not insufficient as a matter of law to sustain plaintiff's
cause of action for brea(~h of 'varranty. As shown by the
discussion in the concurring and dissenting opinions of Justices Carter and Traynor, there is testimony from whieh the
,iury could reasonably infer that the bottle was not improperly
handled in plaintiff's home and that when the bottle was
delivered by Arden it contained a dcfrct which caused it to
break If an inf<'rPJWe to that effret wrre drawn by the
jury, the drfeet in the bottle would constitute a breach of
warranty by Arden under section 1735 of the Civil Code
(Uniform Sales Act, § 15), whieh reads in part: ''Subject
to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf,
there is no implied warranty or condition as to the nuality
or fitness for any particular purpose of goo(ls supplied under
a contract to sell or a sale, except as follo11'S: ( 1) \Vhere the
buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for ·which the goods are required, and
it appears that the buyer rcl ies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturrr or not),
there is an implied ·warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. (2) Where the goods are bought
by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manufaeturrr or not),
thrre is an impliPd warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality." (Italics added.)
Seetion 1735 does not refer merely to goods sold hut to all
"goods supplied under a contraet to sell or a sale." It has
been held that when bottled hevrrages are sold, the bottles
in which they necessarily must be delivered are snpplied
under the contract of sale within the meaning of the statute
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although the bottles are bailed rather than sold.
v.
-Marsh (1920), 1 K.B. 668; see 1 Williston on Sales (rev.
ed. 1948), 582, n. 1.) The Geddling case related to a sale of
"lime juice and soda" in bailed bottles and was decided under
section 14 of the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, which
contains provisions
identical 1vith those
above
from section 17:35. The findings in that case showed that the
sale came within the first subdivision of the
but the
reasoning of the court is equally applicable to a sale coming
within the second subdivision. Accordingly, even if we
assume that the bottle involved here was hailed, it would be
subject to any warranty which would be applicable under
either of the quoted subdivisions if the bottle had been sold.
The sale of a bottle of milk by a dairy under the circumstances appearing here elearly comes within the language of
the seeond subdivision of the statute, and the seller's implied
warranty of merehantable quality under this provision includes a warranty that his product is reasonably fit for the
general purpose for which goods of that kind are sold. (See
Simrnons v. Rhodes & ,Jamieson, Ltcl., 46 Cal.2d 190, 194 [293
P.2d 26] ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 694
[268 P.2d 1041).) It is obvious that a milk bottle which is so
defective that it will break under normal handling is not
fit for the ordinary use for which it was intended and that
the delivery of such a defective bottle constitutes a breach of
warranty.
The buyer may recover for breach of the statutory warranty
without proving negligence on the part of the seller. ( Tremeroli v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 464, 475
[227 P.2d 923]; Vaccarezza v. Sangm:netti, 71 Cal.App.2d 687,
689 [163 P.2d 470]; 1 Williston on Sales (rev. ed. 1948),
617.) Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider in this
dissent whether the evidence is sufficient to support a judgment upon the theory that Arden was nrgligent. Likewise
it is not necessary to discuss whether our decision in II onea v.
City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614 [140 P.2d 369], precludes
resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under the evidence
presented here.
I would affirm the judgment with respect to Owens and
reverse it with respect to Arden.
Appellant's petition for a rehraring was denied May 21,
1958. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

